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ABSTRACT
To what extent does European integration - and the EU’s developing range of
competencies over free movement, immigration and asylum - open new spaces
for pro-migrant transnational mobilisation? Migration scholars have to date not
been well-placed to assess these developments, because of a lack of precision
about the technical dynamics of EU integration. Short of this, their analyses of
migrant mobilisations in the EU tend to be framed either as classic national
struggles for inclusion misleadingly projected to a higher level; or, when
attention has turned to the emergent supranational and transnational dimensions
of the EU, to be dominated by a normative counter-factual logic, that stresses
grassroots mobilisations, notions of multicultural inclusion and idealistic notions
of European citizenship. These various approaches bear little relation to extant
EU competencies, capacities and powers to act, and provide weak empirical
explanations. Our paper pays close attention, therefore, to the actual institutional
context of policy at EU level, in order to demonstrate the ways in which migrant
exclusion/inclusion is structured by legal, political, institutional and symbolic
sources of power, that have been created above all by its core market-making
objectives. A range of migration issues have indeed become Europeanised, and
a clearer specification of these institutional contexts - and the constraints and
opportunities associated with them - may help to pinpoint possible policy
outcomes. We argue that the élite pattern of European integration has stimulated
and induced almost exclusively élite-led political activity within the EU’s
emergent “political field” in this sector, that bear little if any relation to
grassroots “ethnic mobilisation”. Moreover, despite some largely rhetorical
adherence to global ethical norms, European integration in fact stimulates the
development of a specifically regional frame of reference, which may offer
some prospects of non-national membership for legally resident third country
nationals in the future, but which does not substantiate arguments that these
rights are linked to an idea of universalised post-national membership based on
global ethical norms and values.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about European integration often comment on the challenge this
process poses to the sovereignty of European nation states, but less frequently
note that post-war immigration to Europe has challenged the primacy of the
nation state in Europe along many similar lines. As with European integration,
the individual nation state’s unambiguous control over territorially defined
policy-making, population movement and citizenship has in recent years been
compromised by the continued flow of new and increasingly diverse migrants to
the continent (Joppke 1998). This paper explores the degree to which these two
phenomena are interlinked: the ways in which European integration has led to
the development of European Union (EU) competencies for free movement,
immigration and asylum, that in turn may be inducing specifically transnational
political action over migration-related issues.
For this to happen would be a novelty. In the post-war period, control
over immigration has been strictly the domain of nation states - indeed a
defining hallmark of national sovereignty - and immigration policy has thus been
predominantly a national level question. However, internal labour migration (the
free movement of persons) is a foundational tenet of EU treaties, and in recent
years the somewhat artificial division of powers between free movement and
immigration has been blurred. The connection has led to the emergence of new
European co-operative measures which respond to the growing recognition that
the strictly controlled post-colonial and labour migrations of the post-war period
have, in the 1980s and 90s, given way to a set of “new migration” phenomena,
unprecedented in scale and diversity, that cannot be managed by nation states in
isolation (King 1998; Koser and Lutz 1998). With increasing ease of
communication and travel, “transnational” forms of ethnic and migrant
organisation have emerged as a side-effect of the increased interdependency and
porousness of nations (Portes 1997): developments linked together within the
academic rubric of “globalisation”. And, as with other attempts to control and
harness these forces - of which the new “age of migration” is a striking example
- the EU seems caught between two contradictory roles: as a forum for
intergovernmental cooperation to save the declining powers of the nation state;
or, alternately, the context for establishing a genuinely new, regional
supranational body, in which forms of transnational social and political action
are enabled beyond the classic confines of national political and societal arenas.
Scholars in migration, race and ethnic studies have, however, had a
problem convincingly accounting for the developing European dimension to
immigration politics in western Europe. For sure, everyone is aware that Europe
matters, but there are few existing studies which specify in a precise,
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institutionalist style, the new constraints and opportunities opened by the
Europeanisation of immigration politics. Instead, an all-too familiar activist
rhetoric has dominated and compromised academic studies of the effects of the
EU on immigration issues: lamenting the building of “fortress Europe”, the
inevitable “exclusion” of ethnic and migrant minorities, and the inexorable
progress of “racist” or “fascist” Europe; and often exaggerating the powers that
EU institutions in fact have for good or ill. Such rhetoric may be an effective
strategy for protest by groups who feel marginalised by the EU institutions, but
is misleading when analysing what is actually going on at this level. Mainstream
EU scholars who might be able to temper these claims, meanwhile, have mostly
overlooked the subject.
Our paper seeks to remedy these deficiencies (for more comprehensive
empirical studies along these lines, see Favell 1998b, 1998c; Geddes, 1998,
2000fc). We strip back the question to its essentials: asking what, if any, forms
of action or mobilisation can be associated directly with the emergence of free
movement, immigration and asylum competencies. We work through a two-
stage approach to this question: first, specifying the institutional context, then
specifying the actual (rather than imagined or normatively desirable) dynamics
that it has induced because of the opportunity structure it sets up. To do this will
require bringing together two rather distinct literatures. First, we will specify
what is of use in the institutionalist and political opportunity structure literature
on Europeanisation; second, we will show why existing approaches to
‘European’ transnational mobilisation by migration and ethnic studies scholars
fail to engage with the institutional nature and dynamics of the EU. Our aim
here is in fact to show how - because of the institutional properties of this
particular policy sector at the European level - the question of transnational
mobilisation on immigration can, unlike in others, be reduced to a study of the
“Brussels game”. “Transnational” mobilisation of other kinds associated with
immigration issues in Europe, is in fact not linked directly to the European
integration process but other sources of political and social power. We find that
there is indeed pro-migrant and pro-minority activity associated with sources of
legal, political and symbolic power at EU level, but that this has little to do with
the kind of ethnic mobilisation imagined by some scholars. However, despite its
essentially élite nature, by specifying the actual constraints and opportunities
created by European integration on immigration policy enables us to show how
and why the ongoing institutionalisation of aspects of migration policy may lead
to new supranational laws and policy on anti-discrimination or rights for non-
nationals in Europe.
RSC 99/32 © Adrian Favell & Andrew Geddes5
Beyond this, our study identifies a “globalisation paradox” inherent in the
European integration process. EU level co-operation and integration may appear
at first sight to be enabling nation states to regain control over matters that were
slipping beyond them in a globalising age: immigration control being the case in
point. Yet the subsequent institutionalisation of an EU context itself reinforces
the decline of the classic nation state as the context and bounded arena of social
and political action, as new actors emerge to push and extend these
opportunities. The opportunity structure of a cross-national regional entity such
as the EU is thus very different in character to the universal “global” norms of
“personhood” (Soysal 1994; Boli and Thomas 1997) or “international justice”
(Black 1995; Klotz 1995) claimed by many scholars to be the motor of
empowerment for marginalised groups.
INSTITUTIONALISING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
To understand why only certain forms of transnational mobilisation are
successful at EU level, it is necessary to explain mobilisation opportunities by
reference to the specific legal, political and institutional structures and dynamics
of European institutions. This takes us back to considering how mainstream EU
studies conceptualize European integration. Throughout its history, the study of
European integration has been characterised by a macro-level IR dispute
between positions that are locked into the same meta-theoretical rationalist
paradigm. The essence of the dispute is between state-centred
intergovernmentalism and supranationally-oriented “neo-functionalist”
approaches; but to ask whether it is the member states or supranational
institutions that are in charge is actually likely to elicit the response: “both,
sometimes” (Putnam 1988). European integration has, on the one hand, been
advanced at supranational level by the technocratic ethos of the European
Commission, with its key role as policy proposer and implementer. The
European Court of Justice which enforces adherence to Treaty agreements -
and hence the body of European Community law - has actively carved out its
role as a supranational overlord to national level legislation. Integration thus
establishes scope for constitutionalisation -  characterised by IR scholars as the
“domestification of international politics” -  which involve the transformation of
Treaties between states into laws that bind those states. Supranational laws
establish a triangular relationship between EU citizens, the member states and
the EU that empowers individuals and constrains the discretion and competence
of member states (Guild 1998). In turn, this generates an institutionalising
dynamic, which establishes sources of power, authority and capacity to act at
EU level and may induce certain new forms of interest group activity and
mobilisation at the Europe level among specific groups able to engage with and
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use these new European resources.
At the same time, the member states have always exhibited caution about
the extent of supranational authority, which means that legislative power resides
with the Council of Ministers, upon which national governments are
represented, and not the relatively weak European Parliament. A strong
intergovernmental counterbalance to supranationalism has thus always sat at the
heart of European integration. This creates a blurred and fluid context, with
different balances struck in different policy sectors. Only a careful examination
of the interaction between these structures and the agency of actors working
within them allows accurate assessment of actual political opportunities created
at EU level.
What we identify, then, as “transnational” action would consist of political
action or mobilisation enabled outside of the existing opportunity structures of
national level state politics, as a direct or indirect result of intergovernmental
decisions to integrate in a certain policy sector. A case in point in the field of
environmental politics, for example, is the apparent effectiveness of certain
transnational environmental organisations - such as Greenpeace - to become
active voices in the policy making process in Brussels. Such transnational action
takes its cue from the effective lobbying undertaken by transnational
corporations at the European level. It is also facilitated by the specifically élite
and technocratic focus of policy making in the EU, which seeks to incorporate a
range of non-state and non-national actors. Transnationalism of both kinds
works in the new spaces of governance opened up by the internationalisation of
political structures. Transnational action or mobilisation, can be distinguished
from the formal legal and institutional sense of the term “supranational”; the
latter refers to the formal structures of European politics, the former to actors
and organisations within them. The institutionalisation of policy competencies at
supranational level means that to talk about “transnationalism” in the EU context
is to talk about understanding the specific sources of “social power” enabled to
specific people or organisations by European integration. The institutional
channels, resources and symbolic sources of this empowerment are defined by
the EU’s institutional structures, which are neither universal in their scope nor
applicable across all Europeanised policy sectors.
The organisational form, motivations, patterns of interaction, strategic
calculations and alliance-building strategies of Euro-groups will be structured by
opportunities and constraints related to the extent of policy institutionalisation,
which can be measured along three axes (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz 1998).
First, there is the delineation of formal policy competencies by Treaty and
associated legislation. Second, is the establishment of decision-making
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competencies for EU institutions to build on the Treaty framework and develop,
implement and adjudge the legislative framework. Third - and much less clear
cut - is the refocusing of patterns of political mobilisation by societal interests
affected by transferred competencies, which can reinforce existing integration
and build pressure for deeper integration. That said, a weakness of formal
institutional approaches is a neglect of prior issue problematisation. Scholars of
immigration politics need little reminding that the construction of the immigration
problematique is fundamental. The contemporary immigration issue in fact
comprises a bundle of concerns relating to movement of people, the prevention
of such movement and the scope for inclusion of migrants and their
descendants. A core aspect is that certain forms of migration are viewed
negatively as a “threat” and become security-related concerns. This is
particularly the case for undocumented migrants and so-called “bogus” asylum-
seekers. Other forms of migration are, however, viewed positively, for instance
high-skilled labour migration, and are often positively encouraged. The task,
then, is to inquire as to the extent to which the EU’s institutional context reflects
and potentially refracts core migration issues and, thereby, establishes scope for
transnational political activity in relation to constitutionalised and institutionalised
competencies.
The motor of institutionalisation lies in the process by which formal and
informal resources associated with particular policy sectors begin, via their
elaboration and discussion in the EU environment over time to take more
formalised meanings (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Wiener 1998). These
processes of definition, redefinition and elaboration of common interests
become more than an intergovernmental process and certain new relations can
become routinised. A typical process of institutionalisation has been the
European Court’s free movement and equal treatment logic. Thus by “low”
politics (legal rulings, jurisprudence and associated campaigning, funding,
directives etc.) rather than “high” politics (intergovernmental treaties,
parliamentary business etc.) actors mobilise around and operationalise the new
informal opportunities and pressure for their formal institutionalisation in both
low and high arenas. As access to privileged finance/consultancy roles usually is
opened up by the Commission, then the institutionalisation of policy induces
specific forms of political organisation and mobilisation. Typically, this results in
lobbying activity directed towards the Commission as the privileged interlocutor
in processes of elaboration of interests at EU level. Moreover the Commission
itself is a “multi-organisation”, not a monolith, in which there can be conflicts of
interest and policy among even those committed to extend the remit of its
powers (Cini 1996, Cram 1996, Hooghe 1997). There is convergence on “Euro-
norms” linked to the Commission’s role as the putative engine of European
integration (and associated socialisation processes on those who live and work in
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this environment; see Abélès 1996), but intra-organisational competition often
also occurs: especially in policy areas such as migration that so ambiguously fall
across different DGs and different institutional competencies.
Given these patterns of constraints and opportunities, what new forms of
political action or organisation might be expected to thrive in the EU’s
institutional terrain? As a wealth of studies on EU interest groups and lobbying
shows, interest representation at the EU level has been monopolised by
“insider” forms of political action (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Aspinwall and
Greenwood 1997). The technocratic corridors of power in Brussels have
specifically encouraged specialised lobby groups and networks, and have
privileged the co-option of experts and special interests into technical
committees which often articulate interests very different to national
governments. European integration has also placed a premium on specifically
legal forms of politics, capitalising on the role of the ECJ as the most dynamic
arm of supranational power. Among the new forms of action and organisation
inspired are a wide of new transnational groups: lawyers (Burley and Mattli
1993; Schepel and Wessering 1997), business interests (Coen 1997), scientific
experts (Joerges and Neyer 1997), and dynamic NGOs in the fields of
environmentalism or consumer affairs (Rootes 1997; Greenwood 1997) are
some of the more well known.
Although one or two commentators have been moved to see these forms
of institutionalised action as an “élite social movement” (Fligstein and Mara-
Drita 1996) - and hence as the mobilisation of a new Euro-élite campaigning
against the order of power and privilege of élites at national levels (Favell 1998c)
- transnational mobilisation would ordinarily be sought in more conventional
social movements terms. That is, as a public demonstration or conflict strategy,
“in the streets” so to speak; as a public protest movement against existing
political institutions and patterns of power (Tarrow 1998). Classic social
movements type approaches to mobilisation put the focus of mobilisation on the
action of marginal and excluded groups to force representation in political
systems which silence or fail to represent their voices. Some recent work has
been done along these lines by EU scholars, in search of transnational social
movements enabled or provoked by the Europeanisation of European politics.
One example is the work by Sidney Tarrow on trades unions, and the cross-
national coordination of union campaigns against the closure of the French
Renault car factories in Vilvoorde, Belgium and the privatisation of European
railways (Tarrow 1995). Other authors, such as Marks and McAdam (1996)
make the emergence of highly institutionalised European social movements a
hallmark of multi-levelled governance, in which certain groups frustrated at the
nation level have learned to re-focus their activities at the European level, and
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re-shape their organisational forms to the specific institutional terrain of the EU.
Typically, environmental groups, transnational regional developmental agencies,
and well-organised ideals based organisations such as Amnesty have been
successful in this context, but others with more nationally rooted forms of
lobbying and organisation (such as trades unions) have found the corridors of
power in Brussels harder to penetrate.
The technocratic and hybrid nature of European institutions and the
integration process means that it is perhaps misleading to package such forms of
Europeanisation as a “social movement” type of mobilisation. This is because,
in its classic argument, social movements were associated with the rise of the
modern state, and the steady accumulation of powers by central government
and legal institutions (Tilly 1995). Social movements mobilized in the margins
for inclusion, gaining rights and incorporation in return for acquiescence to the
social regime: a logic of the kind made famous by T.H.Marshall’s study of
citizenship in Britain (Marshall 1950). Behind this logic, inevitably, lies a vision
of nation state building and the social integration of all sectors of society in a
common national identity (Crowley 1998). The projection of a similar line of
development - all too common in the many worried counterfactual reflections on
European “identity” or democracy (for example, the influential work of Weiler
1998) - is a wholly misleading misrepresentation of the EU as an emergent
“state-like” thing on a par with national liberal democratic states. It is reliant on
kind a teleological normative and federalising logic, that sees the movement of
European politics as one towards more democratisation and the emergence of a
unified European “public sphere”, as the preliminary to the ultimate emergence
of a (legitimate, democratic) European superstate.
Empirically speaking, actual European integration upsets this teleological
account and its assumptions about the modern nation state and associated social
change. As much of the recent reflection on the “nature of the beast” has
argued, European integration may call for a new vocabulary of political analysis
that is not entirely associated with the stable reference points of nation state
politics, which, in any given policy sector such as immigration, locks us into a
misleading replication of nationally bounded debates about representation,
mobilisation and power (Schmitter 1996; Risse 1995). It might be more
appropriate to think of the EU as a post-modern state without a centre or as a
regulatory state where key terms become decentralisation, deregulation and/or
liberalisation, not the social movements language of public spheres,
democratisation and mobilisation against exclusion (Majone 1996; Caporaso
1996).
More specifically, when looking at transnational action and organisation at
the European level, the distinction between interest groups and social
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movements is getting harder to draw, and the specialization of successful
organisations at the European level (including highly organised social movements
type groups such as Amnesty or Greenpeace), often entails the separation of
these élite groups with the (mass public) constituency they are said to be
representing. European integration, as an uneven and non-linear process, should
therefore be understood as not being on a state-building path, but rather as
opening different “political fields” of action in a state of definition, which are not
fully controlled by the intergovernmental actors that created them. Actors who
successfully invest in the European level of action can also try to pull up the
drawbridge behind them, by defining themselves in relation to other specifically
Euro-policy networks and insider contacts, simultaneously trying to extend the
powers of the European field, in rivalry with the national level political actors,
bureaucrats, lawyers and so on, who previously would have monopolised
political activity in any given sector.
MOBILISING AGAINST “FORTRESS EUROPE”
Many studies of the new forms of lobbying and transnational organisation at the
European level have focused on sectors which for one reason or another are
much more supranationalised than others. Our goal here is not to assess the
political opportunity structure literature on Europeanisation, or discuss highly
Europeanised sectors of policy campaigning, such as environmentalism. Rather,
we wish to examine and explain why a much less developed field such as
immigration policy - which is still largely intergovernmental rather than
supranational in nature - is in fact unlikely to share these characteristics. Also,
having signaled the élite, technocratic nature of interest representation and
political action within European institutions - and the distinct institutional
patterns likely across different sectors - we seek to question why so few studies
of supposedly transnational “ethnic” mobilisations in Europe recognise these
constraints in their discussions. These structuring factors ought to be seen as the
single most important determining factor delimiting the range of immigration-
related action enabled by the European integration process.
For sure, since the mid-80s, there has certainly been a strong
“Europeanisation” of ethnic and racial studies (i.e. Wrench and Solomos 1993;
Miles and Thränhardt 1995; King 1993; Cesarini and Fulbrook 1996; Baldwin-
Edwards and Schain 1994). Immigration and/or ethnic minority issues are now
routinely referred to as a litmus test of the nature of the emergent European
entity, extending the way these subjects have been studied at a national level:
that is, read as a challenge to the principles of liberal democracy and its attempts
to internalise elements of cultural pluralism and diversity (Favell 1998a).
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However, this engagement with Europe is distracted by the superficial normative
rhetoric of European integration, rather than attuned to its institutional
substance. Studies are typically framed by counterposing the “exclusionary”
tendencies of “fortress Europe” and its culturally and racially exclusive
“European identity” with a liberating, “inclusionary” multicultural agenda pushed
from below by ethnic mobilisation around pro-migrant or anti-racist ideas. Via
the usual counter-factual normative reasoning, the emptiness of “European
citizenship” provisions is also routinely pointed to as an example of “democratic
deficit” - and the problem of legitimacy - that could be remedied by an
improved “recognition” of cultural and racial diversity. This kind of work rarely
exposes the actual political dynamics behind such archetypal forms of Euro-
rhetoric; or the very limited institutionalised resources (in terms of the specific
definition we have laid out above) available for a mobilisation of the kind
prescribed.
It was only in the early 1990s that work on migrants and minorities in
Europe began to shift from a Marxist (and predominantly anti-racist) emphasis
on systematic structural exclusion and discrimination (for example: Bovenkerk,
Miles and Verbunt 1990), to one which focused on ethnic minority agency and
collective action, and hence questions of participation, mobilisation and
representation in a comparative perspective. The cross-national project headed
by John Rex was perhaps the first European attempt to develop this paradigm
(Rex and Drury 1994), and since then there has been a number of other
collaborative projects following these lines (Alund and Schierup 1993;
Martiniello 1995; Kastoryano 1998; Modood and Werbner 1998). In addition,
scholars using neo-institutionalist theories and a political science focus on
participation and representation, have opened up a new research program on
immigration in Europe, which emphasises the development of explanatory
theories and comparative method rather than an activist anti-racist or
multiculturalist agenda (Ireland 1994; Soysal 1994; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon
1997; Joppke 1998).
Rex’s earlier work on Britain - and its theoretical frame developing “a
political sociology of multicultural society” - provided the cue for work which
links the normatively desirable (and counter-factual) endpoint of a fully
democratic, multi-national, multi-cultural Europe, with the need for a bottom-up
ethnic mobilisation that pushes for the recognition of ethnic minority and
migrant groups in Europe (Rex 1985; 1997). For all the fine hopes expressed,
the problem, once again, is the unspecified role of actual EU legal and political
institutions in these idealised mobilisations. Underlying Rex’s still unsurpassed
democratic theory of a successful multicultural society, is a vision of ethnic
incorporation which still explicitly hinges on the Marshallian model of
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incorporation; and hence on a nation state centered vision of integration. The
prescribed social change towards a democratic multiculturalism is still firmly
anchored in a nation state structured field of opportunities and constraints, in
which a mix of élite partisanship, bottom-up mobilisation, conflict over ethnic
difference, and progressive ideas of citizenship, welfare-based justice and
equality, provide the sources of social power necessary to challenge the existing
exclusionary social order. There is no progress without a recognition of the
legitimate (national) membership - and hence rights-claims - of ethnic minorities
and new immigrants. Implicitly or explicitly nearly all scholars in the field are
still working within this progressive integrationist paradigm. For reasons evident
from our discussion above, however, the transfer of this model of multicultural
change to “Europe” as a whole reflects rather poorly the extant legal, political
and institutional context and the possible dynamics of change it might lead to.
The EU’s uneven institutional structure, in fact throws up new opportunities and
constraints in places where the European integration process leads to a
differentiation (and disintegration) of the political system, and hence new spaces
of autonomous action for certain political groups. This might be fairly described
as a fragmentation of “the state”: rather than its opposite, the building of a
Marshallian incorporating state.
The second problem running through most recent work on ethnic
mobilisation in Europe is the location of the sources of social power and
successful collective action - and hence the motor of social change - in the
mobilisation of “difference”. That is, ethnic groups which have successfully
pushed for improved recognition within the multicultural state - an often cited
example being Islamic organisations in Europe - are said to have done so by
mobilising cultural, racial or religious “identity” as a collective force (Soysal
1997; Cordell 1999). Ethnicity, however, is only a successful mobilising force
under certain institutional conditions, and therefore ethnicity by itself is not an
independent variable. To test whether there are mobilisations of this kind, the
question has to be posed in a different way: that is, by examining conditions
under which EU institutions may induce “ethnic” mobilisation.
In the one or two examples of studies that have explicitly looked for
transnational ethnic mobilisation in the new European context, both of the two
errors identified above have been made. Kastoryano (1999) reads an emerging
transnational multicultural state into the European integration process and then
connects it with a range of successful transnational “ethnic” mobilisations that in
fact have very little grounding in actual institutional developments at the
European level. Here, an idealised, normative idea of an emergent “European
citizenship” is doing all the explanatory work; an idea of European citizenship
that has little or no basis in the rather empty legal status of European citizenship
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which exists in European treaties. Meanwhile, in earlier, EU-focused studies by
Soysal (1993) and Ireland (1991), the emerging European institutions and
patterns of cooperation are read as offering a fertile, preferential ground for new
“ethnic” based mobilisations, seeking to address claims to European level
institutions rather than traditional national ones. The danger here is to vastly
overestimate what the EU as a institutionalised “state” power can do, as well as
to wrongly assume that it is naturally progressive in its leanings on immigrant or
ethnic politics. Such arguments also misrepresent the degree to which the
genuine new opportunities that do exist, can or have been seized by ethnic
groups themselves, conceived romantically in social movements terms.
Ironically, this over-estimation of the EU is paralleled in anti-European accounts
- the demonic visions popular among activists on the alert for “fortress”,
“fascist” or “racist” Europe - in which the success of a few actors such as police
and border officials in wresting a degree of European autonomy of action, is
misleadingly read as the “state” thereby increasing its own powers. In fact, this
phenomenon again points again to the opposite conclusion: to the decline of the
nation state’s ability to control and organise even the activities of its own agents.
Would a strictly defined institutionalist approach to EU immigration
politics reveal action not structured by the pre-existing national level opportunity
structures that is specific to the European integration process? Examples at the
national level, are Ireland’s institutionalist study (1994) of city level immigrant
participation and representation in six French and Swiss cities, or Bousetta’s
work on Moroccan mobilisation in Belgian, French and Dutch cities (1999fc)
which find that the degree of specifically ethnic-based mobilisation and
representation found in each case is related directly to the institutional structure
of local opportunities and constraints: that is, neither to any common ethnic
variable across city contexts, nor to the overarching national political
frameworks. Successful mobilisation and political action is explained in a way
which specifies when and where the variable of ethnic identity becomes salient
and effective.
An equivalent institutionalist approach to EU immigration politics reveals
that those “ethnic” mobilisations claimed to show the existence of a European
transnational opportunity structure are in fact grounded in institutionalised
structures that have little or nothing to do with anything thrown up by the
European integration process. Successful transnational mobilisation, such as
Islamic protest movements across Europe (Blom 1999), Turkish political
organisations (Amiraux 1998; Ögelman 1998), or new cultural identities based
on transnational media (Hargreaves and Mahjoub 1997) in fact only have a
coincidental connection with the European integration process. They are
sometimes lumped together with discussion of “European citizenship” but bear
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little relation to the rather limited substantive form that this takes in institutional
terms.
The emergence of the EU is indeed an example of “shifts in the post-
World war II state structure” (Soysal 1994). But there are, after all, several
other emergent “supra-national” institutions and institutional contexts that can be
more plausibly pointed to as sources of transnational empowerment which
genuinely lie outside existing nation state opportunity structures; none of these
are specifically “European” in nature. First, are shifts in the global political
economy, opening new opportunities for transnational business and forms of
organisation (Sassen 1991; Portes 1996). Second, are shifts in the geo-political
balance of world politics and international relations: such as the rise in
prominence of Islam, and its increasing attraction as a pole of opposition to the
hegemonic powers of the West (Ahmed 1992). Third, are shifts in international
legal norms, which backed by universalistic international structures such as the
UN, have provided new sources of justification for claims-making (Soysal
1997). These, indeed, may have some grounding in more diffuse “universalistic”
norms about personhood or equal rights of cultural difference, as claimed by
some sociological institutionalists (Meyer et al 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997).
What none of these approaches reveals is anything specifically EU related
about the emergent transnational opportunity structures, whether material or
symbolic in kind. The claim in earlier work by Soysal, Ireland and Kastoryano
was that there was something in the European integration process - either the
formal institutions created or the new symbolic Euro-ideas they give rise to -
which have enabled some specifically ethnic groups to mobilise transnationally.
These claims have remained primarily theoretical assertions, not backed by any
specific findings about the policy impact of such mobilisations in Brussels.
Indeed, more recent work offers empirical refutation of such readings. A recent
study shows that different ethnic groups in Italy and Spain display vastly
different successes in organisation in relation to supposed new European
opportunities, which in fact depend on the help of go-between advocacy groups
such as trades unions and the church (Danese 1998). Moreover, the
organisational behaviour of different ethnic groups is still strongly structured by
national political structures and/or the nature of local opportunities; and, despite
a great deal of talk about new European opportunities, there is a clear
underinvestment in the European level, or, worse, the EU remains remote and
uninteresting, indeed irrelevant, to these ethnic group’s self-perceived interests.
Other scholars also show that Europe has not and does not yet really provide
formal “European” transnational sources of power for ethnic groups themselves
(Guiraudon 1998; Koopmans and Statham 1998). They find the explanation for
mobilisation to be invariably national in location, and most likely to do with
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party cleavages, the depoliticisation of immigration politics by élites, and the
structure of national level conflicts over the content and meaning of national
citizenship.
In other words, to go out looking for ethnic transnational mobilisation
enabled by Europe is to put the cart a long way before the horse. The
institutionalisation process of immigration issues at the European level has yet to
provide this kind of opportunity structure; it is at a much earlier stage. There is
very little empirical evidence for it; and where opportunities exist for some at the
European level, they are not necessarily salient for migrant and minority groups
themselves. Whatever transnationalism associated with the immigration issue at
the European level still needs to be specified in terms of the actual structure of
European institutions; and when it claims to be of an “ethnic” nature, it should
not be taken at face value.
NEW PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ACTION AND THEIR
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
What, if any, transnational forms of action or mobilisation can in fact be
associated with the emergence of free movement, immigration and asylum
competencies at the EU level? Approaching this question immediately takes us
back to the centrality of the free movement of persons to European integration.
Although initially geared to intra-EU labour mobility, these provisions have, by
an incremental process of legal challenges and treaty modifications, since been
extended to other categories of people, such as students, the self-employed and
the retired. The key point about intra-European migration is that it arises
specifically from the economic impetus underpinning the building of the
common and single markets. Too many scholars in this field have been
distracted by the normative discussion over European citizenship - and
associated debates about “inclusion”, “legitimacy” or “democratic deficit” -
which is much less rooted and institutionalised in the actual structures and
dynamics of politics at the European level. The sometimes grandiloquent
rhetoric associated with European integration  - the building of a “people’s
Europe”, for instance - should not disguise the fact that the EU has dominantly
emphasised the attainment of efficiency in relation to capital as its fundamental
goal, rather than democracy as measured by either popular participation or
legitimation. Free movement for people became a key EU objective because it
served market integration purposes, not because it was seen as a way of building
a people’s Europe, or a European identity grounded in transnational citizenship.
Attempts to develop some kind of European public sphere have, therefore,
lagged behind the substantive construction of a European market.
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The creation of a single market defined by Article 8a of the Single
European Act (1986) as “an area without internal frontiers” did, however, mean
that immigration and asylum policy became matters of common concern. As
nationals of EC member states became able to move freely within the single
market then many of the dilemmas of external frontier control shifted to those
member states on the edge of the Union. The attainment of free movement for
people has required “compensating” immigration, asylum and internal security
measures; but this requirement does not dictate the institutional form that these
measures will take – whether they will be supranational or intergovernmental or
whether they are inside the formal Treaty structure or, as was originally the case
with the Schengen agreement, outside it. Nevertheless, immigration and asylum
have become Europeanised, even if by a non-intentional backdoor route.
Moreover, this development imparts a fluidity to the nascent co-operative
structures, which may offer opportunities for entrepreneurial actors interested in
opening up new European level opportunities. Indeed, the very logic of using
cooperative European fora in this way, may also create its own integrative
institutionalising dynamic, regardless of the largely national-interest based
positions of national politicians and public officials. As Koslowski (1998) charts
in some detail, cooperation on restrictive policy is still a form of integration: the
routinisation and elaboration of cross-national ties between the most nationalist
public officials and politicians in the Brussels or Luxembourg context will still
lead slowly to actors in the supranational institutions of the Commission,
Parliament and Courts being drawn in to these modes of European cooperation.
Ad hoc routines can thus eventually gain supranational political or legal review.
Although immigration and asylum policy is not yet institutionalised at the EU
level to the extent that free movement is, new informal resources for other
actors accrue from this incremental refocusing of activity. The emergence of a
pro-migrant NGO network in Brussels and Strasbourg are examples of this
(Geddes 1998). Another is the “wining and dining culture” that has developed at
European level for interior ministers from EU member states, which has
important socialisation effects (den Boer 1996).
The establishment of EU immigration and asylum co-operation marks an
uneasy transition from state-centred immigration policy where issues were the
firm province of the nation state to Europeanised immigration and asylum policy
co-operation where states remain the key actors, but where dilemmas of
immigration control and immigrant integration have acquired a European
resonance. The Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam
Treaty have all contributed to a slow and cautious movement towards
incorporation of immigration and asylum within the EU’s institutional
framework, driven by the core institutional dynamic of preserving and extending
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free movement for EU citizens. That said, immigration and asylum cooperation
have not been exclusively a by-product of single market liberalisation. Co-
operation on aspects of immigration policy also builds upon the anti-
terrorism/crime co-operation between interior ministries and their officials from
the mid-1970s, through the Trevi Group. Although, single market liberalisation
has been the key theme propelling immigration and asylum closer to the web of
Europeanised policy interdependencies, patterns of security co-operation in fact
have been longer established and framed structures for immigration and asylum
co-operation that drew from the model for co-operation established for internal
security.
The recent history of evolving immigration and asylum policy can, then,
be read in terms of these general structuring principles and tensions. Three key
periods in the development of co-operation in this policy sector can be
identified. The “ad hoc intergovernmentalism” between 1986 and 1993 fell
beyond the purview of scrutiny and accountability to either elected or judicial
authority and was also criticised for exacerbating the democratic deficit. The
post-SEA period failed both efficiency and democracy tests (Guyomarch 1997).
The Maastricht Treaty attempted to deal with the efficiency critique of ad hoc
intergovernmentalism by creating an intergovernmental Justice and Home
Affairs “third pillar” as part of the new EU. Pillarisation did not mean
supranational integration. Immigration and asylum became matters of “common
interest”, but not common policies. The “pillar” was not a part of supranational
Community law, and Community institutions still played little part in policy
development. Decision-making authority remained located in the Council of
Ministers. Mechanisms for collective action among member states were also
weak. The member states developed an array of non-binding immigration and
asylum conclusions, recommendations and the like, that reflected a degree of
new political activity and demonstrated routinised co-operation. These
seemingly muddled and messy intergovernmental compromises have allowed
member states to use European cooperation to slip domestic political and judicial
constraints.
The divisions between member states over the extent of immigration and
asylum policy co-operation and the possibility of supranationalisation had
already become evident when the Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985
(followed by an Implementing Accord in 1990). There were important divisions
among member states about the desirability of free movement for people.
British governments refused to countenance the removal of its external frontier
controls; although, at the same time, opposition to a frontier free Europe has
been matched by enthusiasm for more and better internal security cooperation.
Other member states were far more willing to push ahead to the removal of
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internal frontiers for their nationals, coupled with compensating immigration,
asylum and security arrangements. Schengen was an agreement in international
law and fell outside of EC law. The Commission did, however, have observer
status and supported Schengen’s objectives because they chimed with
Community objectives.
The Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997 (which came into force on May 1
1999) imports the Schengen arrangements into the Union and establishes a new
Treaty chapter dealing with free movement, immigration and asylum. They
have been “communitarised” by being brought into the main institutional
framework of the Union and within the remit of the Commission, Court and
European Parliament; but member states have also brought with them the
machinery of intergovernmentalism with unanimity as the decisional modus
operandi. ECJ jurisdiction is restricted by a “national security” clause which
may potentially limit its remit (although time will tell whether this is the case).
Moreover, although key aspects of Europeanised immigration and asylum
policies are included within the new chapter, and a five year post-ratification
target specified for their attainment, it is less clear how the five year target can
be attained when unanimity remains the basis of decision-making. Amsterdam
also made provision for “closer co-operation” or flexible integration. This was
made manifest in the opt-outs from the free movement chapter secured by
Britain, Ireland and Denmark.
Amsterdam’s other significant innovation was the extension of anti-
discrimination provisions. Before Amsterdam, the EU possessed capacity to act
on nationality- or gender-based discrimination. Amsterdam Treaty confers upon
the Union power to act with regards to discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
religion, age, disability and sexual orientation. However, this new provision is
not as strong as the Treaty commitment that forbids discrimination based on
nationality. Rather, the Commission can introduce proposals in this area, which
must then be agreed in the Council by unanimity. Nevertheless, the new anti-
discrimination clause was lauded by pro-migrant NGOs community as indicative
of successful mobilisation. Some observers have stressed (Bigo 1998;
Huysmans 1995) that migration is mainly subsumed within a security paradigm,
within which emphasis is placed on the development of the legislative apparatus
and technologies of cross-national population control. However, there has also
been a dynamic established between securitisation and liberalisation, that may
lead to inclusionary effects for non-nationals legally resident in EU member
states.
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THE DYNAMICS OF EU IMMIGRATION POLITICS
The above overview of recent developments specifies the basic parameters of
the EU immigration and asylum policy context. Given this, we may now ask:
who is able to successfully engage with these new opportunities for action, and
what forms does this action take? As is now common in much POS based
theory, we define the opportunity structure as a political and legal combination
of “material” resources (formalised resources of power or funding) and
“symbolic” ones (sources of normative and discursive power) (see McAdam et
al 1996). Our foregoing discussion indicates that most of the new forms of
action that might be associated with European integration in this sector will be
élite and technocratic in nature: bottom-up mobilisation and participation of all
kinds is limited by the EU’s obvious lack of channels for democratic
representation. However, it would be wrong to automatically conclude that this
situation will automatically reinforce “fortress Europe” tendencies that lead
towards more immigrant exclusion, because there are also inclusive tendencies
well established in the EU’s institutionalised activities. In fact, the oft-cited
argument that European integration has strengthened “fortress Europe” is
weakened by our observations, which have made it clear that European
integration has not created many further opportunities for promoting exclusion
that were not already being exploited by the member states through existing
intergovernmental fora. Insofar as further European integration creates a
counterbalancing supranational force to the jurisdiction of national governments
over immigration matters, it has generally worked against openly exclusionary
tendencies. However, the “progressive” forces at work within the EU
institutions are not so much “challenging the European fortress”, as searching
for a path towards the institutionalisation of EU authority which will be able to
encompass both the “control” and “inclusion” dimensions of migration policy.
It is also significant to note that pro-migrant organisations at EU level tend
to see more not less Europe as a corrective to lowest common denominator
Council-based decision-making. The cure for fortress Europe and democratic
deficit, they say, is more Europe (albeit often conceived as an unrealistic,
counterfactual ideal of a democratic, multicultural, citizenship-grounded
transnational polity). The underlying argument here, then, is not that the process
of European integration per se is the problem; rather the problem is the actual
form taken by immigration and asylum co-operation. The basic confusion in the
anti-EU/pro-Europe argument may be intentional - it works in the same away as
a national government’s ability to generate symbolic resources by blaming the
EU for its own impotence or failures - or may simply indicate a basic ignorance
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of how the EU institutions in fact work, and how successful campaign groups
do in fact get involved in the policy process. As long as people conceive of the
EU in counterfactual normative terms that have little to do with the way the
institutions actually work, they will keep making this mistake.
Most powerfully among new actors benefiting from material resources
associated with the ad hoc intergovernmental fora are police, customs and
military experts, redefining a cross-national security role in the aftermath of the
end of the cold war (see also Anderson and den Boer 1994; Bigo 1996). They
have been particularly strong in the new arenas created by the Third Pillar (such
as the Third Pillar Task Force), as well as in the powerful DG1 (External
Affairs). Links with the Brussels-based offices of the West European Union on
military and security cooperation have also often been built around immigration
and asylum matters. “Europe” also provides certain symbolic resources to the
security minded officials and politicians. The double-sided nature of the fortress
Europe metaphor offers significant discursive resources to those seeking to
accrue powers or mobilise opinion through immigration-related fears. That is, in
the encouragement of a “crisis” atmosphere over immigration and asylum - and
the representation of such flows as a security threat - security focused officials
and anti-immigration politicians can draw on a good deal of capital through
promoting the idea that a fortress needs to be built (perhaps to protect European
welfare systems, or national models of democracy...). The symbolic blaming of
“Europe” for national inadequacies of immigration control, in turn reinforces the
idea that any European cooperation in this sector must first and foremost be
about intergovernmental security and control issues. However, the point here is
that such immigration controls may already exist in each national context, but do
not necessarily work; with or without Schengen. There is a drift away from
addressing the reality of the actual causes of migration - primarily labour market
dynamics, and standard push-pull features of east/west and south/north
population movements - towards simply instrumentalising the spectre of
immigration in order to legitimise new security powers. Many of the new
information-based police and customs practices institutionalise a degree of
technical expertise that naturally releases them from further legal or political
scrutiny.
A further dimension to the security agenda has been the cooperation
between these experts and private business interests concerned with providing
the technology for the new security practices. On the one hand, there has been
the active co-option of private companies - such as airlines - in the enforcement
of immigration controls: many official passport checks are now devolved to the
airlines themselves, who are heavily fined if they carry irregular passengers
(Lahav 1998). On the other, there is the emergence of an industry of security,
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providing the new technology of control itself: the vastly expensive computer
technology that has made possible the Schengen Information System (cross-
national monitoring of various ‘threats’ such as undocumented migrants) or, for
example, the new Dutch population information system that links social security
with police and city records, in order to connect the monitoring of informal
labour market activities with illegal immigration.
In other, more “progressive” Europeanised circles, however, the idea of
immigration is no less of a resource-stimulating area of policy activity. In some
areas of European integration the “regulatory” character of policy has always
created scope for “entrepreneurialism” by supranational level actors when legal
and political competencies are established and a significant margin of autonomy
for action has developed (Majone 1996). In such circumstances, the
Commission can become a “purposeful opportunist” (Cram 1996) emboldened
by the material and symbolic resources associated with European integration to
push new policy lines in different sectors activity on which immigration and
asylum touches. Initially, it was left wing figures within the Parliament such as
Glyn Ford who were behind some of the first awareness campaigns and general
declarations, but these carried little policy weight. In more recent years,
numerous DGs have also opened activities relating to immigration and/or the
position of minorities in Europe. DG5 (Employment and Social Affairs), DG10
(Information, Communication and Culture) and DG12 (Science, Research and
Development), in particular, have been very active. Latterly, the Third Pillar
Task Force and the Forward Studies Unit of the Secretariat have published
reports on immigration policy, or tendered substantial sums of money for new
research in this area. These entrepreneurial efforts have followed a familiar
pattern of co-opting experts into the policy community (including academics,
existing NGOs, public officials and so on), and some attempt at public
awareness campaigning and localised activities (such as multicultural activities
associated with the European Cultural Capitals program).
Brussels is a small world. In the sector under consideration here there are
only a handful of people with direct responsibility within the Commission, and
so strong personal contacts in Brussels can quickly lead to a prominent role in
policy circles. A new - albeit small - “field” is emerging of specialist policy
campaigners who have been able to monopolise European level policy thinking
through their well-located awareness of key contacts and specialised know-how
needed to be effective in the Brussels environment (for a more detailed study of
the organisational reasons for this effectiveness, see Favell 1998c). Among those
with a strong interest in immigration and migrants’ rights are ECAS (European
Citizenship Action Service) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG). Although
only small scale offices, these organisations provide an important port of access
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for wider nationally-based networks of activists and campaigners. The NGO
world in Brussels is charaterised by a high degree of mobility and personal
contact between the various specialist NGOs in the social policy area (i.e.,
groups concerned with development, inequality or gender and disability
discrimination, but also some trades unions and environmental groups) who
operate through a loose coalition of “kindred” organisations. Their success,
however, is also linked to the gate-keeping role they play: acting as go-betweens
for national-based associations, by offering a kind of “translation” and
consultancy service for the confusing Brussels scene. The effect of this is to
block national representatives, unschooled in the “habitus” of the Euro-world,
from direct transnational participation. The Brussels specialists thus ensure they
become the key “inside” players - the ones most likely to get a phone call from
a sympathetic Commissioner or Chef de cabinet -  via the way they offer
specific products tailor made for the Commission’s policy process: such as
“expert” reports, draft directives, background conferences and public relations
material. Their achievements on behalf of migrants and minorities, although real,
are very far from substantiating the claimed existence of “transnational ethnic
mobilisation” in this policy sector; quite the contrary.
While there are reasons for anticipating some confluence between
Commission objectives (to promote Europe integration) and an improvement in
the rights and status of Europe’s migrants and minorities - because of the
intimate connection between free movement commitments and the evolving
immigration and asylum policy - it should not be assumed that the figures within
the Commission or elsewhere will automatically have a progressive view about
migrants’ rights. Rather, what may exist is a positive view about the
Commission’s own role in this policy context, and the need to counterbalance
intergovernmental tendencies created through other European channels, with
supranational powers of review and protection that will turn out to be
“progressive” in nature. The most likely areas, then, for progress in this sector
are improved parliamentary and legal scrutiny on intergovernmental cooperation
on immigration; new anti-discrimination clauses in the equality of treatment
sections of the treaty; a residents charter that will finally establish basic free
movement rights for Europe’s 11 million “third country nationals”; and the
adoption of “fair” asylum policies as they would be judged by the standards laid
down in international law.
A central focus of efforts to establish these measures was the run up to
the 1996/97 IGC (intergovernmental conference), in which a whole plethora of
campaign groups, with well established insider positions, were able to push for
new migrant and minority rights (Mazey and Richardson 1998). Prominent
among these were the Starting Line Group, which linked together over 200
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NGO associations from a variety of countries (though the French were notable
for their absence). This group was in fact coordinated in Brussels by the
Migration Policy Group. Their main tactic was to push for a starting anti-
discrimination clause based on free movement/equal treatment provisions in the
previous treaties. Prominent figures were associated with the London-based
“Justice” organisation, the Immigration Lawyers Practitioners’ Association and
the Dutch “Standing Committee” of experts on the rights of migrants. It was less
the moral force of the citizenship packaging used in these groups’ rhetoric that
enabled them to be effective, than the well-focused legal arguments on the
necessary competence and coherence of European Community law in this area,
and their timely presentation of draft proposals. Unfortunately, free movement
provisions for third country nationals stalled in the run up to the final treaty, and
consolation had to be taken with the anti-discrimination provision (Article 13)
and an enhanced commitment to public awareness campaigning on anti-racist
themes. This was something facilitated by the timely election of the Labour
government in Britain and the green light they gave to the new anti-racist
monitoring centre in Vienna. In the publicity surrounding the new treaty’s
movement in this area, the Commission also took the opportunity to re-launch
its own plans for a residents’ charter, combating some of the major deficiencies
on third country national status not yet resolved by the Amsterdam Treaty. It
remains to be seen whether this kind of partisan, Commission-led
entrepreneurship will be able to overcome some of the formidable
intergovernmental forces ranged against it.
For all this worthy activity, none of this can be classified as ethnic
mobilisation. It is rather an élite social movement of ex-pat entrepreneur-
campaigners, successfully investing in the new Brussels based opportunities for
political involvement, that work to exclude “grass-roots” representation. The
one direct attempt by the Commission to create a genuine ethnic “forum” for
direct representation within the European institutions - the European Union
Migrants’ Forum - has fared much less happily. A large amount of money was
invested by DG5 in creating this consultative body drawn from over 400
national level associations in order to give migrants and minorities a voice at the
European level. However, the early years were dogged by inter-ethnic conflict
over the goals and strategy of the Forum, a financial scandal amongst the
executive, and an overwhelming sense of the operation as well-meaning but
ineffective sounding box, in which a few migrant élites got to voice their anger at
well funded conferences, but without it leading to any direct impact in the policy
process. Similar things might be said about the European Year Against Racism
of 1997, in which a large range of funding was spent unevenly on local projects
often monopolised by go-between groups and immigrant entrepreneurs, with a
weak claim to be representative of migrant and minority interests on the whole.
RSC 99/32 © Adrian Favell & Andrew Geddes24
As with many other areas of EU intervention, good intentions and strong
personal commitment among members of the relevant Commission units can be
hampered by uneven implementation at national and local levels. Very little
significant grass roots activity has been directly inspired by the EU’s material or
symbolic resources, and it remains an area of policy firmly monopolised by the
gate keepers working in the shadow of the Commission; much to the anger, for
example, of other local Brussels based Belgian campaign groups and migrants
associations, who are most conscious of being excluded from the benefits
flowing into other parts of the city.
Given, as we have argued, that market-making and the commitment to
free movement are the main forces driving more inclusionary tendencies in
immigration and asylum policy, it is surprising to note the absence in the past of
any significant business led pressures for expansive migration policies in this
sector. The fact that transnational corporations have always been active in
Brussels makes this all the more surprising. Further down the line, then, there is
still the possibility that the dynamics of the European labour market and
business interests - as they did in the post-war boom years and the age of the
guest worker -  will start to have the clout within the EU agenda to push for
more open immigration policies. This is a major point of difference between
Europe and the US/NAFTA, where a sizable right wing pro-immigration lobby
has always pushed for open borders and the import of cheap labour from
Mexico and elsewhere (Freeman 1995). Perhaps on smaller, local level there is
evidence for this: such as the Berlin labour market influencing new, pragmatic
bi-lateral agreements between Germany and Poland; or seasonal labour needs in
Spain or Italy pushing regularisation efforts by their respective governments.
The involvement of transnational business interests in this way could indeed
provide a decisive shift in the balance of powers in immigration policy, moving
away from the intergovernmental to supranational level. To incorporate an
awareness of the underlying structural labour market factors in determining
population movements, would also be a significant step towards a more rational
European immigration policy; a policy which at present is so hamstrung between
opposite but complimentary ideological arguments about inviolable national
interests and sovereignty on the one hand, and a transnational, multicultural
Euro-idealism, on the other.
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CONCLUSION: EUROPEANISATION VERSUS GLOBALISATION
The Europeanisation of immigration politics in Europe, potentially contains with
it a fundamental challenge to one of the defining characteristics of the European
nation state: its powers of self-definition and authority over a territorially
bounded population. Most European nation states were built on incorporation
and territorial closure through the establishment of national citizenship; many
incorporated immigrants and minorities as part of this process (Brubaker 1992).
The powers of the state - and the institutions of law, democracy, welfare it
sustains - were centralised through this exclusive process of identity formation.
Immigration and the integration of newcomers in the post-war period has
previously followed this pattern in most European nations. All of the above, it
would appear, is thrown into question by the establishment of supranational
powers and jurisdiction over immigration questions at the EU level.
However, progress in this area is slow. We have argued that empirically it
makes sense to look for a distinct European “transnational opportunity
structure” in the immigration policy sector only where specific channels and
sources of empowerment have begun to be institutionalised. As yet, these are
limited and exclusive to organised élite groups. This places the accent on
technocratic and judicial channels of campaigning. These efforts may indeed
contribute to challenging European nation states’ control over immigration, but
they cannot be said to contribute to better democracy or citizenship-style
inclusion for migrants and minorities in Europe. In fact, they can be said to be
positively damaging to the value of national citizenship as it is understood at
national level, because any new “post-national” rights - such as those based on
residence or the allowing of dual citizenship - will naturally render national
citizenship less meaningful, less identity forming, more instrumental, more
incidental for migrants. The fear is they will no longer have to integrate as in the
past. However, if the response to this is to move back towards an idea of
European citizenship premised on naturalisation and incorporation, control over
new populations would be returned back to the nation state, and thus the
European integration process that had opened up “new opportunities” would be
reversed in favour of the old Marshallian option which can see nothing beyond
national identity as the background to social change (see Hansen 1998; Weil
1996). Indeed, at the point which it stands, the current empty, nation state
derived, idea of EU citizenship only reinforces this older idea of national
membership and belonging.
Within the strictly delimited picture of EU integration we have offered,
what kind of transnational opportunities remain for a true migrant or minority
led mobilisation. The symbolic resources provided by the emergent idea of
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Europe should perhaps prove the most fertile source. However, transnational
claims making is as yet more backed up by other more obvious “transnational
structures” than the limited European context (Soysal 1997). Indeed the
institutionalisation of immigration and asylum at EU level would probably prove
directly damaging to the kinds of universalistic, global values powering post-
national visions of membership: European-bounded rights and membership is
not same thing as human rights or a world community.
The question, of course, remains as to how far supranationalising
tendencies will be institutionalised at EU level. Although, the idea of European
citizenship is unlikely to be extended further (citizenship surely seems destined
to remain bounded within the logic of nation state building premised on social
integration, solidarity and belonging), supranational powers over non national
residents may well creep though under the logic of free movement and the rights
of resident workers. Clearly, if this space is opened, it will provide a strong
impetus to transnational communities interested in rights derived from legal
residence in two or more countries, particularly if these rights are linked to the
growing acceptance of dual nationality (Freeman and Ögelman 1998). There is a
very anti-Marshallian kind of idea at work here: the idea that certain rights might
be given to resident workers of the EU single market, unconditional on
nationality, belonging, moral investment in the nation, or even national welfare
contributions. These are interesting possibilities for those ethnic groups most
able to organise themselves transnationally, and whose support networks and
business networks in any case stretch across their nations of residence and back
and forth to their homeland. Were these opportunities to develop, they may well
open up a form of symbolic legitimation of action not grounded in the old
equality and justice based logic of inclusion and incorporation that has been at
the heart of most classic social movements style campaigning.
Behind these opportunities for claims making, there may be a link with
universal human rights and evolving international ideas of personhood.
However, the counter argument is that the emergence of a European free trade
zone with completed free movement rights - of the kind imagined above -
would constitute a European “regime” that would cause a direct deterioration of
the international legal regime on rights of persons, particularly in the areas of
protection of asylum seekers and the suppression of statelessness (a potential
consequence of allowing dual nationality and/or rights based on residence alone,
see Koslowski (1998)). There is a potential clash of international and European
law here. It is instructive that NGOs and campaigners side with Geneva and
internationalised legal powers rather than the emerging Europeanised ones. They
believe, perhaps correctly, that the co-operative building of a distinct European
legal framework will not strengthen rights against nations but rather allow
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national governments to slip international responsibility. European integration is
here seen as merely a covert way of returning arbitrary powers over individuals
and populations back to the nation state.
What this underlines ultimately is that European integration is a particular
type of internationalising process: the institution building process of a specifically
regional cross-national cooperative entity. European integration is the political
supranationalisation of sovereignty understood in its contemporary form as the
right to exclude, over certain political powers and a specifically European
“geographical” space, and over an uneven range of policy sectors and law, that
is both responding to globalising transnational processes and associated powers
(particularly those led by international capital), while, at the same time, creating
new political and legal institutions which formalize the possibility of transnational
action of a specifically delimited European kind. The essentially ambiguous
dynamic of the European integration process lies here: in that it is caused by
globalisation, an attempt to harness globalisation, and in some sense a campaign
against globalisation. This also leaves the EU in a paradoxical relation with other
forms of “transnationalism”, such as the global environment or human rights
movements. As a regional entity - between nation state and united nations -
European institutions and Europeanisation often cut across and/or contradict
these universalising movements and the universalistic norms they are built on
(Klotz 1995).
This last point may pose severe difficulties for NGOs and other idealist-
based social movements who ground their raison d’être in universal ethical
norms of this kind. Europeanisation in the end leads to rather different forms of
transnational action and legitimation. To date, most progressive minded
campaigning on immigration issues in Europe has grounded its arguments in
ethical norms, that are either based on a logic of citizenship grounded in nation
state incorporation (and therefore not transnational at all), or on a logic of
universal personhood (which is global, and not connected to the specific
European context). Our argument suggests that both of these strategies are
ineffective and poorly suited for seizing the dynamics of European integration.
Campaigners would do much better to push for an immigration policy, that
seeks to reconnect policy with the labour market mechanisms and market
building needs that are actually a primary cause of migration flows. Were this to
happen - were in other words Europeanisation genuinely be seen to truly enable
claims making in virtue of being a non-national resident worker of a European
common market – then the possibility of membership beyond the nation state
may still turn out to true. But an extraordinary European development such as
this, would also entail that the transnational rights of non-nationals in Europe are
established at the expense of the more distant, global “ethical” norms and values
RSC 99/32 © Adrian Favell & Andrew Geddes28
that have been hitherto seen as the grounding for effective transnational social
and political action.
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